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VERTICAL DISTRIBUTIONAL RESTRAINTS UNDER 
SCHWINN AND SYLVANIA: AN ARGUMENT 
FOR THE CONTINUING USE OF A 
PARTIAL PER SE APPROACH 
Martin B. Louis* 
For more than fifteen years a critically important debate has 
raged over the proper antitrust treatment of vertical territorial 
restraints on distribution. The debate began with the district court 
decision in United States v. White Motor Co.,1 exploded over the 
Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.,2 
which established a partial per se rule in this area, 3 and was renewed 
recently as lower courts have begun to extend or apply Schwinn. 4 
The latest round of cases and commentary reveals that Schwinn's de-
tractors are in the ascendency.5 Almost all commentators deplore 
* Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law. A.B. 1956, 
Princeton University; LLB. 1959; LL.M. 1965, Harvard University.-Ecl. 
1. 194 F. Supp. 562 (N.D. Ohio 1961), revd., 372 U.S. 253 (1963). 
2. 388 U.S. 365 (1967). 
3. The decision prohibited the imposition of territorial restraints, which designate 
the area to which the resales of a distributor are confined, and customer restraints, 
which designate certain classes of persons to whom a dealer can or cannot sell 
purchased goods. 388 U.S. at 377-78. For a more comprehensive definition 
of these restraints, see notes 33-34 infra. Nothing was said about other vertical 
territorial restraints, which presumably remained subject to the rule of reason. 
4. The Ninth Circuit sitting en bane reversed the initial panel decision and held 
that location clauses are not per se unlawful. GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., 
Inc., 1974-1 Trade Cas. 96,792 (9th Cir. 1974), revd. en bane, 537 F.2d 980 (9th 
Cir.), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 252 (1976). 
Other courts have divided over whether the per se rule should give way when 
resale is reasonably restricted to protect the health or safety of the user, or the quality 
of the product. Compare Adolph Coors Co. v. FfC, 497 F.2d 1178, 1187 (10th Cir. 
1974) (product quality justification), and United States v. Glaxo Group, Ltd., 302 F. 
Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1969) (health and safety justification), with Tripoli Co. v. Wella 
Corp., 425 F.2d 932 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831 (1970) (health and safety 
justification); and United States v. First Prods. Corp., 1972 Trade Cas. 93,025 
(S.D.N.Y. 1972) (safety justification); and LaFortune v. Ebie, 26 Cal. App. 3d 72, 
102 Cal. Rptr. 588 (1972) (product quality justification). A few courts, in apparent 
dissatisfaction with Schwinn, have sought to avoid its effect through spurious 
refinements and distinctions. See, e.g., Janel Sales Corp. v. Lanvin Parfums, Inc., 
396 F.2d 398, 406 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 938 (1968), in which the court 
noted that, unlike Schwinn, the defendant in Janel had not been "firm and resolute" 
in enforcing territorial restraints. However, this distinction is false, because Schwinn 
had employed it to find an agreement in the face of unwritten restraints, whereas the 
Janel restraints were in writing. For criticism of this and similar cases, see Robinson, 
Recent Antitrust Developments: 1974, 75 CoLUM. L REV. 243, 273-74 (1975). 
5. Some of the recent commentary includes Robinson, supra note 4; Note, The 
Per Se Rule As Applied To Vertical Territorial Restraints: An Improper Standard, 
275 
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the opinion as unforgivably bad. 6 A few critics demonstrate that the 
entire line of cases, of which Schwinn is a critical part, lacks a con-
sistent theoretical basis, 7 and many more argue that, because vertical 
restraints have mixed competitive effects that are the subject of con-
1975 DUKE L.J. 935; Comment, Schwinn Re-cycled-Enforced Restrictions 011 Loca-
tion of Franchised Retail Outlets Held a Per Se Violation of Section I of the Sherman 
Act, 49 N.Y.U.L. REV. 957 (1974); 88 HARV. L. REv. 636 (1974). Earlier 
commentary is cited in Note, Territorial Restrictions and Per Se Rules-A Ree1•alua-
tion of the Schwinn and Sealy Doctrines, 70 MICH. L. R:;.v. 616, 626 n.83 (1972), 
6. See, e.g., Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of tire 
Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 15 
COLUM. L. REV. 282 (1975). 
There are three basic criticisms of Schwinn. First, the Court is accused of 
reneging, for no articulated reason, on an earlier promise to eschew per se rules until 
it understood more of "the economic and business stuff out of which these arrange-
ments emerge." White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963). One 
commentator has suggested, somewhat cynically, that the extensive 23-volume 
record compiled by the lower court in Schwinn more than satisfied the Court's desire 
for knowledge and explains its hasty change of mind. See McLaren, Territorial and 
Customer Restrictions, Consignments, Suggested Resale Prices and Refusals to Deal, 
37 ANITfRUST L.J. 137, 144 (1967). 
Second, the Court has been chastised for almost totally ignoring the merits and 
relying instead on the essentially irrelevant "ancient rule against restraints on 
alienation." 388 U.S. at 380. Although this common-law rule was invoked in an 
early decision holding vertical price fixing per se unlawful, Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. 
John D. Parke & Sons, 220 U.S. 373, 404-05 (1911), it was thereafter ignored until 
its resurrection in Schwinn. Furthermore, it was never absolute and would not 
necessarily have outlawed all such vertical territorial restraints. See Handler, The 
Twentieth Annual Antitrust Review-1967, 53 VA. L. REV. 1667, 1684-86 (1967). 
However, it turns out that the rule is a convenient description of the most dangerous 
restraints, which arguably should be per se unlawful anyway, and that therefore it 
may be less arbitrary than heretofore believed. 
Third, the Court has been criticized for establishing what has been called an 
anomalous exception to its per se rule for territorial and customer restraints imposed 
in agency or consignment relationships, and for sustaining under the rule of reason 
Schwinn's use of restraints in this context because it faced strong competition from 
mass merchandisers. See 388 U.S. at 380-81. No effort was made to explain why 
such competitive pressures should not also excuse price-fixing clauses in consignment 
arrangements, which the Court had condemned in Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 
U.S. 13 (1964). Of course, there can be no restraint on alienation when title to 
goods does not pass. Furthermore, the Court stressed that the person to whom goods 
have been consigned must be "indistinguishable in function from agents or salesmen." 
388 U.S. at 381. While Schwinn's wholesalers satisfied this test, its retailers, who 
normally purchased most of their inventory, did not. Thus, this exception for 
consignment relationships should be limited to intermediate distributors who function 
like and could easily be replaced by company salespersons. See Zimmerman, Distri-
bution Restrictions After Sealy and Schwinn, 12 THE .ANrrrnusT BULL. 1181, 1188-89 
(1967). This distinction may indicate the Court's partial acceptance of the much 
advanced but generally rejected contention that a manufacturer should be permitted to 
achieve by contract what it could achieve by vertical integration. See, e.g., Standard 
Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 315-21 (1949) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
Acceptance of this contention may make sense here, however, because of the ease 
with which Schwinn might· have made the substitution. 
7. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 6. 
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tinning debate and inquiry,8 their per se condemnation is for the 
moment totally inappropriate. 0 
It is possible, however, to accept most of these criticisms and yet 
still to conclude that some use of the per se rule for vertical re-
straints is well-advised. A restraint is traditionally not to be con-
demned as per se unlawful unless its anticipated harm is great and 
its alleged redeeming virtues are few, random in occurrence, and 
unlikely.10 Not all distributional restraints, whether used alone or 
in certain combinations, can now be definitely so characterized. Al-
though this may therefore rule out the use of the per se approach 
for all vertical restraints, it does not necessarily preclude the use of 
such an approach for some of them, which is all that Schwinn re-
quires. Many vertical restraints are at least partially interchange-
able. Consequently, the business needs that would be served by 
those restraints that are now per se unlawful can be satisfied in 
whole, or at least in substantial part, by those that are not.11 Thus, 
the present outright condemnation of the most dangerous restraints 
does not necessarily impose great burdens on business. This partial 
per se approach is hardly novel: How else can we logically explain 
the generally accepted prohibition against resale price fixing, 12 which 
is merely one of the most restrictive vertical restraints?13 
A partial per se approach is not necessarily acceptable, however, 
simply because it is less mischievous than a general one. Positive 
justifications are needed, and one in particular can be identified. 
Adoption of a rule of reason standard for popular business practices 
must necessarily generate a substantial volume of protracted litiga-
tion that will consume substantial prosecutorial and judicial re-
sources, 14 and that frequently cannot yield results that are "accurate," 
8. Compare Zimmerman, supra note 6, and Comanor, Vertical Territorial and 
Customer Restrictions: White Motor and Its Aftermath, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1419 
(1968) (attacking the widespread use of such restraints), with Bork, The Rule of 
Reason and Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 15 YALE L.J. 375 
(1966) (generally exonerating the use of such restraints). 
9. >See Robinson, supra note 4. 
10. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). 
11. See generally Note, Restricted Channels of Distribution Under the Sherman 
Act, 15 HARV. L. REv. 795 (1962). 
12. Vertical price fixing was prohibited long ago in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John 
D. Parke & Sons, 220 U.S. 373 (1911). In 1975, Congress repealed the Maguire Act, 
which had exempted from the Sherman Act state fair trade laws permitting vertical 
price fixing. Pub. L. 94-145 § 2, 8-9 Stat. 801 (1975). 
13. See Posner, supra note 6. 
14. The volume of litigation since Schwinn's per se rule was announced is itself 
impressive evidence of that which a more inviting rule of reason approach might 
generate. See note 4 supra. Furthermore, Schwinn's extensive record is suggestive of 
the size and complexity of cases tried under such an approach. See note 6 supra. 
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"consistent," or "predictable."15 Consequently, as the administrative 
burdens become apparent, and as the decisions reached seem 
increasingly to tum on the unarticulated values and attitudes of the 
courts rather than on the reasons set forth in their opinions, there 
is not surprisingly a growing temptation to adopt some type of bright-
line test like the per se rule to achieve more predictable results more 
easily, if less "accurately." 
This phenomenon has been manifested in the vertical distribu-
tion cases, which seem to cry out for a departure from the rule of 
reason approach for several reasons. First, as section I of this article 
will show, vertical cases frequently involve a package of restraints-
a characteristic that compounds all of the difficulties of evaluation 
mentioned above. Second, vertical restraints reduce intrabrand com-
petition in order, supposedly, to promote interbrand competition. 
Thus, even if we could identify and measure both the procompetitive 
and anticompetitive effects of a particular restraint, we cannot 
assume a one-to-one equivalency, and we lack a workable process by 
which we can compare the net effect each way. Thus, all we can 
presently do under the rule of reason is muddle through. Finally, 
under a rule of reason standard an avalanche of vertical restraint 
cases would be a real possibility. The extreme reaction to Schwinn 
from the antitrust bar implies more than dissatisfaction with the deci-
sion's rationale: It suggests thwarted desires to employ vertical re-
straints widely and, if necessary, the will to litigate their legality 
under the rule of reason. The delay and uncertainty that would 
inevitably result from such a volume of litigation would surely invite 
questionable uses of restraints and even more litigation. Thus, a 
rule of reason approach to such cases would cause great uncertainty, 
delay, and waste, could not yield predictable or consistent results, 
15. See Posner, supra note 6, at 298. No one to my knowledge contends that 
economists, let alone judges, can provide consistent, predictable results in such cases, 
even if the necessary time and resource commitment were made. For this reason, 
perhaps, application of the rule of reason is being cut back in other areas governed by 
section 1 of the Sherman Act. Compare United States v. Container Corp. of 
America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969), with Maple Flooring Mfrs. Assn. v. United States, 
268 U.S. 563 (1925). Furthermore, one recalls the confident assertion of the Federal 
Trade Commission that it was willing and able, as an expert administrative tribunal, 
to make rule of reason determinations in exclusive dealing cases, see Maico Co., 50 
F.T.C. 485, 488 (1953), despite the Supreme Court's conclusion in Standard Oil Co. 
v. United States, 3-37 U.S. W3, 309-14 (1949), that the courts could not. Hindsight 
suggests that the Commission's success in this effort was less than conspicuous. See 
generally Bok, The Tampa Electric Case and the Problem of Exclusive Arrangements 
Under the Clayton Act, 1961 SUP. Cr. REV. 267. 
December 1976] Vertical Distributional Restraints 279 
and would have only the hollow satisfaction of theoretical purity to 
commend it.16 
There is no known escape from this problem other than some 
kind of bright-line test or approach. One such approach is the 
"structural" rule of reason test presently used in exclusive dealing17 
and merger18 cases, whereby certain readily ascertainable market fac-
tors are identified and weighed to predict market effects, but no effort 
is made to measure actual market effects, upon which volumes of rele-
vant information might be produced.19 The other available bright-
line standard is Schwinn's partial per se test, whereby the most re-
strictive practices are outlawed and other, less restrictive substitutes, 
which, as section II will show, are readily available to replace the 
prohibited restraints, are accepted as presumptively lawful under the 
rule of reason. Most of Schwinn's antitrust bar critics would prob-
ably also reject the structural approach, which was hardly applauded 
in its Clayton Act debut.20 However, the full rule of reason ap-
proach these critics advocate as an alternative would throw the prob-
lem into the proverbial briar patch, in which only they would feel 
at home. Consequently, there is a temptation to disregard further 
consideration of their position, supported as it is by so obviously 
interested advocacy, until they acknowledge and deal with its obvious 
difficulties. In any case, it is the position of this article that the par-
tial per se rule represents the best available balance between 
business needs and the imperatives of antitrust enforcement. 
16. Professor Turner has recently articulated the nature of this problem in a 
different area of antitrust law as follows: 
It would impose great and probably unmeetable demands on the capacity of 
the enforcement process to define exclusionary conduct accurately and pre-
cisely, and to reach appropriate results in a burgeoning variety and number of 
individual cases. It would greatly increase the risk that enforcement costs 
would considerably exceed welfare gains. 
Turner, The Scope of "Attempt to Monopolize," 30 REC. OF N.Y.C.B.A. 487, 498 
(1975). 
17. E.g., Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 329 (1961); 
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949). See Bok, supra note 15. 
18. E.g., United States v. Philadelphia Natl. Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); Brown 
Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962). See Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton 
Act and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74 HARV. L. R.Ev. 226 (1960). 
19. For commentary in support of a structural or "truncated" approach for 
vertical distribution cases, see Note, 49 N.Y.U.L. REv. 957, supra note 5, at 969; 
Note, supra note 11, at 823-34. 
20. One good reason is a growing awareness that structural factors are generally 
not accurate predictors of market performance, especially when only a few factors are 
examined, and that at best they are useful in identifying markets for which more 
extensive analysis may be productive. See generally H. GoLDSCHMID, H. MANN & J. 
WESTON, INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: Tim NEW LEARNING (1974). 
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I. THE USES AND EFFECTS OF VERTICAL 
DISTRIBUTIONAL RESTRAINTS 
[Vol. 75:275 
Vertical restraints are designed principally to reduce or eliminate 
competition in the distribution of a product.21 However, they may 
also strengthen the product's competitive stance, enhance interbrand 
competition, and effect a net competitive gain. 22 It is necessary to 
determine, therefore, which end was sought or achieved, and then 
punish or commend accordingly. That inquiry, however, is difficult 
and complicated, 23 especially in the real world of mixed motives and 
effects. 
Only one short cut has traditionally been accepted. If dealers 
coerce a reluctant manufacturer into imposing vertical restraints, they 
are regarded as acting horizontally and, ordinarily, illegally.24 If, 
however, the restraints are unilaterally imposed by the manufacturer, 
the result is a series of vertical agreements in restraint of trade. 26 
Whether these agreements are unlawful is the troublesome question. 
According to one line of reasoning, vertical agreements cannot ipso 
facto enhance the horizontal market power of a manufacturer,20 and, 
to its partial detriment, such restraints will ordinarily reduce the level 
of dealer competition.27 Consequently, if a manufacturer elects to 
employ them, it presumably anticipates countervailing, beneficial 
effects upon the marketing of its products. Therefore, it is argued, 
21. See Comanor, supra note 8, at 1422-23. 
22. Id. 
23. See text at notes 14-16 supra. 
24. This is the so-called masked horizontal restraint which is tantamount to illegal 
horizontal market division. E.g., United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 
127, 140-48 (1966); White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 267 (1963) 
(Brennan, J., concurring). 
25. In theory, a vertical "agreement" need not exist since a manufacturer could 
unilaterally impose its will by threatening not to deal with those dealers who do not 
accede to its wishes. The line between a refusal to deal and an implied agreement is 
very fine, however. See United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960). In 
fact, Schwinn holds that a manufacturer's "firm and resolute" enforcement of its 
wishes will itself constitute an agreement under section 1 of the Sherman Act. 388 
U.S. at 372. 
26. See Bork, Vertical Integration and the Sherman Act: The Legal History of an 
Economic Misconceptio11, 22 U. Cm. L. RE.v. 157, 197-200 (1954). 
27. It was once generally argued that since any distributional restraint might 
enhance dealer markups, it would also reduce retail sales to the manufacturer's 
detriment. While this is generally true for a single-firm monopoly, it does not follow 
for an oligopoly if the profits resulting from the inflated markups are used by dealers 
to create consumer preferences for the product, since product differentiation to some 
extent isolates a manufacturer, to its advantage, from price competition. See Coma-
nor, supra note 8, at 1425. 
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such agreements should presumptively be regarded as reasonable, 
procompetitive measures, and certainly not as per se unlawful. 28 
Despite its superficial appeal, there is a major flaw in this argu-
ment. Vertical restraints are ineffective in the face of interbrand 
competition unless the product already possesses market power, or 
the acquisition of such power is anticipated. The purpose or effect 
of vertical restraints, furthermore, may be to create, enhance, or pre-
serve market power, ordinarily through common promotional efforts 
of the manufacturer and its distributors to differentiate the product. 29 
In fact, since most vertical cases involve branded products susceptible 
to promotional differentiation, such a purpose or effect is likely, 
rather than merely speculative. Three conclusions seem to follow. 
First, if both a manufacturer and its dealers believe that the use of 
distributional restraints will create or preserve promotional differen-
tiated market power, they will ordinarily concur in their imposition. 30 
Consequently, inquiries into the source of the restraints-that is, 
whether the manufacturer truly acted unilaterally or was forced by 
its dealers to adopt vertical restrictions-rather than into their effects 
will often be unhelpful, irrelevant, or misleading. 31 Second, if the 
principal purpose or effect of such restraints is the creation of market 
power, their existence obviously need not be tolerated, regardless 
of who imposed them. Third, if reasoned inquiry into such purpose 
or effect is, as suggested above, burdensome and generally unpro-
ductive, the use of a partial per se test to overcome these difficul-
ties is still a potentially reasonable solution to the problem. Thus, 
28. See Bork, supra note 8; Posner, supra note 6, at 298. 
29. Comanor, supra note 8. Needless to say, not all product differentiation is to 
be condemned. Product differentiation and the associated market power that results 
from having a truly better product or distribution scheme, or from advertising and 
promotion that inform consumers of these merits, are desirable. Some promotional 
efforts, however, seek a measure of differentiation beyond that attributable to the 
relative superiority of the product, or in spite of its relative inferiority. I shall 
hereafter refer to these efforts as promotional product differentiation. It is obviously 
difficult to draw the line between legitimate promotion and promotional product 
differentiation. Nevertheless, a line does exist and we may legitimately make policy 
to discourage firms from crossing it, even though the available techniques are at _ 
present somewhat crude. And, of course, we can certainly forbid or refuse to exempt 
under the antitrust law restraints apparently having this goal as their principal purpose. 
30. See P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 500-04 (2d ed. 1974). 
31. See Posner, supra note 6, at 298. Although a manufacturer and its dealers 
might concur in the desirability of imposing restraints, they might disagree over the 
appropriate level of restraints. A rational manufacturer should never prefer a higher 
level than the dealers, who may desire more than "efficiency." See P. AREEDA, supra 
note 30, at 500 n.4. Thus, evidence of the source of the restraints might arguably be 
relevant in predicting their effects. Unfortunately, the line between coercion and 
cooperation is so hard to discern, and the measure of effects is so elusive, that some 
might tend to give evidence of the source of the restraints disproportionate weight. 
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while Professor Posner is correct in arguing that the crucial inquiry 
should focus on the effect rather than the source of the restraints, 
and that price and nonprice vertical restraints should be approached 
in the same fashion, both he and Professor Bork are far less persua-
sive in suggesting that unilaterally imposed restraints are necessarily 
or presumptively unharmful, 32 and that none are appropriate for per 
se treatment. Before a standard can be devised for vertical re-
straints, however, it is necessary to examine their interrelated usage 
and effects. 
A. The Interrelationships of Vertical Restraints 
Vertical restraints vary significantly in anticompetitive impact. 
At one end of an imaginary scale there are territorial restrictions33 
and customer limitations, 34 which like resale price fixing generally 
bar competition, or some crucial aspect of it, absolutely; moving 
along the scale, there are the exclusive franchises35 and location 
clauses, 36 which create significant territorial barriers to competition 
but do not explicitly prohibit it; finally, there are clauses providing 
for profit passovers37 and areas of primary responsibility, 38 which do 
32. See Posner, supra note 6, at 298; Bork, supra note 26. As Professor Areeda 
has pointed out, a manufacturer's strategy is to maximize profits, not sales, and it may 
succeed through a higher price per unit with reduced output, a result that "does not 
necessarily reflect more efficient resource use for society." P. AREEDA, supra note 30, 
at 504 n.12. 
33. A territorial restriction "is a promise by the buyer that he will not sell the 
goods outside a specified area or to customers who reside or have their place of 
business outside of that area." Note, supra note 11, at 796. 
34. Customer limitations embrace 
promises by the buyer not to sell to certain customers or classes of customers 
who are identified other than by their location. Included in this category are 
promises not to sell to governmental units or to other large customers whose 
business is reserved for the manufacturer; promises by wholesalers to sell only 
to retailers who have been approved by the manufacturer, by retailers to sell 
only for use and not for further resale, and by consumers not to sell at all; 
promises not to sell to a particular customer within a specified period of time 
after another dealer or distributor has made contact with him; and promises to 
sell only to a certain class of customers-drug stores but not hospitals, for in-
stance. 
Id. 
35. The exclusive franchise or sole outlet provision "denotes a promise by the 
seller of the goods to the buyer not to sell to other outlets within the buyer's 
'exclusive territory' and not to sell directly to consumers within that area." Id. 
36. A location clause prohibits dealers from opening other outlets, epecially in 
another's exclusive territory, without the approval of the manufacturer. 
37. A profit-passover clause requires a dealer who sells in another's territory to 
pay over to the latter all or some portion of the former's profit on the sale. Note, 
supra note 11, at 814. 
38. A primary responsibility clause requires a dealer to concentrate sales efforts 
in a particular territory or at a particular location. See generally Note, Area of 
Primary Responsibility Clauses and the Antitrust Laws, 35 U. PnT. L. REV. 671 
(1974). 
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not prohibit intrabrand competition in the first instance, but only 
seek to "discourage" it to one degree or another. Not surprisingly, 
perhaps, the "bars" are now per se illegal, 39 and impediments like 
location clauses may be, 40 but the rest are presumptively lawful 
under the rule of reason. 41 
Restraints also vary in effectiveness and desirability depending 
on the type or level of distribution affected. This may be illustrated 
by several common examples. First, wholesalers that locate volume 
buyers through salespersons and ship to them are obviously more 
adversely restrained by territorial prohibitions than by location 
clauses.42 The opposite is true for most retailers, whose customers 
generally come to them. Thus, .in order to obtain a territory closed 
to other authorized distributors, a wholesaler generally requires an 
exclusive franchise coupled with a territorial restraint, whereas a re-
tailer generally requires an exclusive franchise coupled with a 
location clause. 43 
Second, the effective marketing of some products at retail, 
especially low-priced, convenience goods like cigarettes and gasoline, 
ordinarily requires too many closely spaced outlets to permit the ef-
fective use of territorial restraints.44 Sometimes so many dealers 
handle a product that inefficient sales volumes, discounting, price 
wars, and bankruptcy become everyday problems.45 In such situa-
tions resale price control or limitations on the advertising of discount 
prices is the only potentially effective way to limit intrabrand 
competition. 46 
39. Schwinn itself made territorial restrictions and customer limitations per se 
unlawful. Resale price fixing was barred long ago in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John 
D. Parke & Sons, 220 U.S. 373 (1911). 
40. See note 4 supra. 
41. Exclusive dealership or sole outlet agreements have generally been up-
held, except where the grantor had monopoly power. Packard Motor Car Co. v. 
Webster Motor Car Co., 243 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 822 (1957); 
P. AREEDA, supra note 30, at 529 n.33. Area of primary responsibility clauses have 
routinely been approved by courts, see, e.g., Colorado Pump & Supply Co. v. Febco, 
Inc., 472 F.2d 637 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 987 (1973), and inserted in 
consent degrees, see Robinson, supra note 4, at 279 n.216. In fact, such a clause 
appears in the final decree in Schwinn itself. 1968 Trade Cas. 85,568 (N.D. Ill. 
1968). Courts have similarly approved the use of profit-passover clauses. See, e.g., 
Superior Bedding Co. v. Serta Assoc., 353 F. Supp. 1143 (N.D. III. 1972). 
42. See Note, supra note 11, at 811. 
43. Id. at 796. 
44. Id. at 795. 
45. These events once occurred with regularity in the retail marketing of gasoline. 
See generally FfC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.!;. 505 (1963); American Oil Co. v. FfC, 
325 F.2d 101 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 954 (1964). 
46. See Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 19 n.5 (1964) (resale price 
control). 
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Third, in the marketing of expensive, durable consumer items, 
such as major appliances and automobiles, manufacturers can readily 
limit the number of their retail outlets and control intraband competi-
tion through distributional restraints. 47 In recent years, however, 
urban sprawl and suburbanization have often increased the number 
of outlets needed in metropolitan markets at a time when increasing 
consumer mobility, the growth of discounting, and the increasing 
geographic reach of some forms of advertising often require wider 
spacing of dealers to make geographic restraints effective.48 Until 
recently, as noted in the second illustration, the most effective re-
straint was often resale price control, or, if that was not possible, limi-
tations on the advertising of discount prices.49 With the recent 
repeal of the Maguire Act, 50 however, all direct resale price main-
tenance is now per se unlawful, and manufacturers must attempt to 
deal only with dealers who either will not discount or will not adver-
tise that fact, or refuse to deal with those who do. 01 
Fourth, some wholesalers may attempt to maximize their short-
run sales volume by eschewing proper dealer spacing or selection. 02 
To prevent this, manufacturers have sometimes compiled lists of 
"approved" retailers, or have attempted to prevent wholesalers from 
selling to certain undesirable retailers, such as discount stores. 03 
Such customer limitation clauses were also used to prevent whole-
salers or retailers from selling excess or unwanted inventory at 
bargain prices to unauthorized retail outlets. 54 Such clauses are now 
47. Note, supra note 11, at 795. 
48. Id. at 804. For example, a television advertisement seen within a SO-mile 
radius, which is estimated to be the distance for which consumers will shop for 
automobiles, id. at 810, covers an area of approximately 7,850-square miles. If the 
advertiser's place of business is near the center of the circle, it can be reached by most 
viewers by automobile within an hour. Within that area, especially if it is a major 
metropolitan area with suburbs, a manufacturer of expensive, durable consumer goods 
must obviously have many authorized dealers. 
49. Some manufacturers have sought to place limitations on discount price 
advertising within the context of their cooperative advertising plans. The Federal 
Trade Commission has, however, announced an intention to challenge such limita-
tions. 74 F.T.C. 168-1 (1968). 
50. Pub. L. 94-145 § 2, 89 Stat. 801 (1975). 
51. It is well known, of course, that the line between refusal to deal except on a 
stipulated condition and agreement is very indistinct and that one who seeks to walk 
it virtually courts a lawsuit. The risk is probably even greater when a manufacturer 
distributes through wholesalers and must use them to control the retailers. See 
United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960); P. AREEDA, supra note 30, 
at,599-60. 
52. Note, supra note 11, at 821. 
53. See, e.g., United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 ( 1967). 
54. In United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966), Chevrolet 
dealers were supplying automobiles to unauthorized discount houses. Because of the 
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per se unlawful under Schwinn, 55 and, therefore, a manufacturer 
who wishes to limit intraband competition must rely on lawful per-
suasion, dealer selection, or threats of termination. 
Finally, clauses designating areas of primary responsibility or 
providing for profit passovers are essentially the less restrictive alter-
natives to territorial prohibitions,56 but, as a practical matter, they are 
probably more effective generally in restraining cross-selling by 
wholesalers. 57 A primary responsibility clause in effect urges a distrib-
utor to cultivate its own fields; a profit-passover provision taxes it for 
harvesting another's. Of course, the former may be a cover for an 
illegal territorial division58 and the latter may have that effect if the 
tax is high enough. 59 But absent such illegal purpose or effect, both 
are presumptively lawful today under ·the rule of reason. 60 
B. Particular Restraints 
1. The Exclusive Franchise 
The foregoing discussion suggests that the linchpin of many dis-
tributional restraints is the exclusive franchise, which stakes out the 
territory for a particular dealer and excludes the manufacturer and 
its future appointees. It is reasonable to believe, therefore, that this 
restraint would be most susceptible to antitrust challenge. Experi-
ence has shown otherwise, however, and an inquiry reveals several, 
continuing relationships between some dealers and the discounters, General Motors 
sought to curtail the practice by enforcing location clauses contained in the dealers' 
franchise agreements. Such relationships may also be barred by clauses requiring 
retailers to sell only for use and not for further resale. See Note, supra note 11, at 
821. 
55. 388 U.S. 365 (1967). Although some special exceptions to this rule have 
been announced by lower courts, see note 4 supra, none offer hope to manufacturers 
seeking primarily to prevent sales to unauthorized or undesirable outlets. 
56. The profit-passover clause is, in fact, often the principal device by which 
manufacturers enforce violations of territorial clauses, because the alternative of 
terminating the franchise is often so onerous. See Note, supra note 11, at 814. 
57. The retail price of some goods may include allowances for installation or 
warranty services. If the customer purchases from a distant dealer, he may call upon 
a local dealer for these services. Id. at 812. To compensate the local dealer, 
manufacturers often impose a profit-passover clause in their retail franchise agree-
ment. Id. at 812, 814-15. 
58. See, e.g., Hobart Bros. v. Malcolm T. Gilliland, Inc., 471 F.2d 894 (5th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 412 U.S. 923 (1973); Interphoto Corp. v. Minolta Corp., 295 F. Supp. 
711 (S.D.N.Y.) affd. per curiam, 417 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1969). Cf. Fontana 
Aviation, Inc. v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 432 F.2d 1080 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 
401 U.S. 923 (1971). 
59. See Sharp Elec. Corp., 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1[ 20,638 (1974). 
60. See White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 271-72 (1963) (Bren-
nan, J., concurring). 
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closely related, extremely technical reasons for its general antitrust 
immunity. 
Virtually all restraints limit the conduct of distributors who pur-
chase from the manufacturer; the exclusive franchise is an exception, 
however, since it limits the conduct of the manufacturer, who is the 
seller, and, consequently, it is not technically a restraint on aliena-
tion. 61 Moreover, although the manufacturer needs promises from 
distributors to control their conduct, it obviously needs none to con-
trol its own. Therefore, it could always unilaterally implement a 
lawful program of de facto exclusive franchising even if the promise 
thereof were unlawful. Futhermore, a manufacturer could also 
conceal or deny oral promises by representing that its conduct was 
unilateral, and its refusal to franchise new dealers would not be evi-
dence to the contrary. Finally, the exclusive franchise confers an 
individual benefit upon a dealer, who would bargain for it independ-
ently. Other restraints entail detriments for individual dealers that 
become benefits only when other dealers are similarly bound, and 
these are bargained for accordingly. The interdependent conduct 
of the dealers in the latter situation smacks of illegal horizontal group 
action, 62 whereas their independent conduct in the former situation 
doesnot.63 
These distinctions, however, are formalistic and ignore the fact 
that a de jure exclusive franchise is still an agreement in restraint 
of trade64 that dealers -would seek to obtain, since it may dampen 
intrabrand competition to a greater degree than any other restraint. oG 
Thus, a curious anomaly is presented: the territorial restraint most 
threatening to competition is virtually per se legal. An obvious ex-
61. GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 1974-1 Trade Cas. 96,792 (9th 
Cir. 1974), revd. en bane, 537 F.2d 980 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 252 
(1976). In effect, the manufacturer that grants an exclusive franchise accepts a 
restraint upon its future sales. Traditionally, however, the doctrine has only protect-
ed purchasers. See Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373 
( l!n 1); Robinson, supra note 4, at 277 n.213. 
62. See generally Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: 
Conscious Parallelism and Refusal to Deal, 15 HARV. L. REv. 655 (1962). Professor 
Turner argues that such conscious parallelism by dealers in accepting even interdepen-
dent restraints should not itself be prima facie evidence of horizontal agreement by 
them. Otherwise any unilateral program of such vertical restraints could then be 
found to be per se unlawful. Id. at 695-700. I do not mean to question that 
argument here. Nevertheless, that which is not itself prima facie evidence of 
agreement may still be considered probative of that fact in the light of other 
evidence. 
63. See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 161 (1968) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting). 
64. 88 HARV. L. REV. 636, supra note 5, at 643 n.42. 
65. Note, supra note 11, at 805-09, 824 (1962). 
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planation for this development is that some form of territorial protec-
tion is often necessary to recruit and retain dealers, who must invest 
substantial time, money, and effort in the development of their terri-
tories. 00 This is a concession that some distributional restraints are 
probably procompetitive and that not all of them should be declared 
per se unlawful. It does not follow, however, that none should be. 
Nor does it follow that the exclusive franchise should be virtually 
exempt from the rule of reason.67 Some grants of exclusive fran-
chise are unlimited in duration, or are extended routinely08 beyond 
the time needed to attract new dealers. 00 Surely it is arguable that 
these are unreasonable and unlawful, and there is no reason why 
courts cannot so find. There is a good reason, however, why they 
have not and perhaps should not: Although the exclusive franchise 
is not challenged, even when it is arguably unreasonable, other re-
straints are condemned under Schwinn, even when they are arguably 
reasonable. In other words, a bright-line trade off has evolved 
whereby some restraints are conclusively unreasonable and others 
are presumptively reasonable in order to avoid the hard question of 
reasonableness in most cases. 70 Those who want Schwinn overruled 
have never acknowledged the existence of this compromise. They 
should understand that success in their endeavor may mean a closer 
scrutiny for other practices, the legality of which they now take for 
granted. 
2. The Location Clause 
As indicated above, the territorial restriction and the location 
clause are employed at the wholesale and retail levels respectively 
to confine distributers within specified sales areas.71 Since these re-
straints ordinarily are not complementary and, therefore, are rarely 
66. Id. 
67. The only apparent exception is when the manufacturer's market power 
becomes prohibitively greaL P. AREEDA, supra note 30, at 529 n.33. 
68. This may be the exception rather than the rule, especially at the retail level, 
where multiple outlets can better serve the convenience of retail customers. See 
Note, supra note 11, at 825-27. Nevertheless, in leading cases like White Motor, 
Schwinn, United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967) and United States v. 
Topco Assoc., Inc., 1973 Trade Cas. 93,797 (N.D. Ill.), affd., 414 U.S. 801 (1973), 
the exclusive franchises were all apparently unlimited in cluration or were extended 
routinely. 
69. The time period for new dealers would vary, of course, depending on the time, 
investment and effort required to create a successful dealership and the time needed to 
recover a sufficient return thereon to justify iL 
70. See note 41 supra. 
71. See text at notes 42-43 supra. 
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used together,72 the prohibition of the former in Schwinn is no 
reason, as some have argued, to exempt the latter. In fact the 
opposite conclusion is logically more compelling; otherwise territorial 
confinement and perhaps closed sales areas73 would be barred at 
wholesale but permitted at retail.74 Furthermore, if a limitation on 
where or to whom purchased goods may be resold is an illegal re-
straint on alienation, arguably so is a limitation on the location from 
which they may be resold.75 Curiously, however, few commentators 
suggested after Schwinn that the location clause was implicated, 70 
and many seemed to be genuinely shocked by the first decision to 
that effect. 
These commentators argue that if the location clause were 
condemned, a manufacturer would lose all control over retail distri-
bution and "would exhaust his right of dealer selection . . . once 
he appointed a single dealer"77 since a dealer once "franchised any-
where ... is franchised everywhere."78 This conclusion is essenti-
ally correct, yet it did not deter the Schwinn Court from prohibiting 
the imposition of territorial restraints on wholesalers, to whom the 
same rationale applies. 79 There is no reason why retailers should 
not also come within the prohibition. Furthermore, in neither situa-
tion is the loss of control absolute. A dealer selling in another's ex-
clusive territory will suffer increasing transportation costs unless the 
manufacturer is willing to ship directly to the dealer's customers or 
72. I know of no case in which these two restraints were jointly employed. A 
likely situation, however, was that in White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 
(1963 ), where dealers enjoyed a locational advantage with respect to some customers, 
but were also able to compete for substantial nonlocal business. 
73. An exclusive territory protected by territorial restraints or location clauses is a 
closed territory. 88 HAR.v. L. REV. 636, supra note 5, at 639. 
74. It does not necessarily follow that an exclusive franchise can be lawfully used 
with a location clause just because neither is per se unlawful. Yet it has been argued 
that the combination is a natural one whose legality can be implied from the legality 
of the exclusive franchise. See, e.g., GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 
537 F.2d 980 (9th Cir.) (en bane), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 252 (1976). 
75. See GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 1009 (9th 
Cir.) (en bane), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 252 (1976) (Kilkenny, J., dissenting), 
76. See, e.g., McLaren, supra note 6, at 144-45; Pollock, Alternative Distribution 
Methods After Schwinn, 63 Nw. U.L. REV. 595, 603-04 (1968). One reason, 
perhaps, was the Supreme Court's refusal a year earlier to rule on the legality of such 
clauses, see United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 139-40 (1968), 
which had theretofore been upheld, see Boro Hall Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 124 
F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 695 (1943). 
77. McLaren, supra note 6, at 145. 
78. GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 998 (9th Cir.) (en 
bane), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 252 (1976) (emphasis omitted). 
79. A wholesaler free of territorial clauses is as much franchised everywhere, once 
franchised anywhere, as is a retailer whose location cannot be fixed, 
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to any location it establishes there. Such direct shipments into the 
territory would, however, arguably violate the manufacturer's prom-
ise of exclusivity80 and justify its refusal so to deal; such a refusal 
could, of course, be regarded as evidence of the "firm and resolute" 
enforcement of a territorial policy.81 But if it is lawfully implied in 
the grant of the exclusive franchise, as I think it is,82 a distributor's 
ability to operate anywhere at wholesale or retail is significantly 
limited by the cost of transshipping merchandise from its nearest 
authorized location.83 Finally, a manufacturer's ability to control 
80. There is some evidence that manufacturers have refused to make such direct 
shipments in order to discourage territorial invasions. Apparently some have also 
refused to supply all or part of the merchandise needed. Note, supra note 11, at 
816-17. The legality of these tactics is discussed in note 82 infra. 
81. See note 24 supra. 
82. A seller that grants an exclusive franchise promises not to sell to anyone 
within the territory. See note 35 supra. Thus, it seems lawful for that seller to 
refuse to deal directly wiili another dealer's location within iliat exclusive territory or, 
arguably, to refuse to ship to customers within that territory at the order of an 
invading wholesaler, since to do otherwise would appear to be a breach of contract. A 
more difficult question concerns ilie legality of a refusal to supply to an authorized 
location all or part of ilie inventory that the dealer intends to ship to or sell in 
another's exclusive territory. The manufacturer does not seem to be violating the 
other's exclusive franchise, and since it would otherwise willingly fill the order, its 
refusal to do so would be tantamount to an imposition of a territorial condition on 
resale. 
Similar analysis presumably applies if a manufacturer has promised not to 
enfranchise more than a certain number of dealers within a territory or has simply 
promised the existing dealers not to enfranchise anyone else. But what if no such 
exclusive promises have been made? Perhaps a manufacturer's right to choose 
dealers with such territorial considerations in mind itself includes the right to such 
partial refusals to deal. Thus, if a manufacturer could lawfully refuse a new 
franchise in city X because the distributor there, though not protected by a promise of 
exclusivity, is thought to be adequate, why should it be compelled to deal directly with 
a new location there owned by a dealer franchised elsewhere? 
83. Such partial refusals to deal are not as readily available to a manufacturer 
who sells to wholesalers. According to Schwinn, a manufacturer may not limit or 
select retail customers of wholesalers. Consequently, it presumably may not grant to 
a retailer an exclusive franchise that would be enforceable upon a nonassenting 
wholesaler, who, as a practical matter, must make the grant itself and would 
thereafter be bound like a manufacturer dealing directly. 
The real question, ilien, is wheilier a manufacturer can compel or contractually 
bind reluctant wholesalers to make such grants or oilierwise to restrain ilieir retail 
customers. This question has not been discussed widely. The Court in United States 
v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 45-46 (1960), suggests that a manufacturer's 
threatened refusal to deal with a wholesaler who continues to deal with an offending 
dealer named by the manufacturer exceeds the exception in United States v. Colgate, 
250 U.S. 300 (1919). Parke, Davis does not hold, however, that a manufacturer 
cannot convey in advance to a wholesaler a desire for a policy of restricted retail 
distribution and simply refuse to deal wiili one who fails to honor it. Furthermore, 
no case prohibits a manufacturer from binding a wholesaler by contract to any such 
program that ilie manufacturer could itself lawfully impose upon retailers with whom 
it deals, or might have dealt, directly. Arguably, iliere is no restraint upon alienation 
if, in satisfaction thereof, the wholesaler ilien grants exclusive franchises that prevent 
it from dealing with oiliers. The promise to make such grants could of course be 
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locations and protect territories at retail has already been substan-
tially impaired by the per se illegality of customer limitation clauses, 
which were used to prevent distributors from "enfranchising" unau-
thorized persons within another's territory.84 It does not follow, of 
course, that because a manufacturer's control over retail locations has 
been limited, it must be eliminated. On the other hand, new 
locations by authorized retail dealers will often be more potent com-
petitors than unauthorized bootleg dealers. 85 Consequently, if a 
manufacturer can no longer use customer clauses to bar the latter, 
it should a fortiori also be unable to use the more restrictive location 
clause to bar the former.86 
It follows from this analysis that the location clause is directly 
implicated by the result in Schwinn, and not merely by a mindless 
application of its restraint on alienation rationale. Consequently, if 
it is not to be declared per se illegal, it must be otherwise differen-
tiated from the territorial clause or shown to fulfill a need peculiar 
to retail distribution. Some commentators claim the two clauses are 
distinguishable in their effect: the location clause, it is argued, only 
hinders competition whereas the territorial clause bars it absolutely.87 
This claim is exaggerated on both ends. At the retail end a dealer 
with a fixed location may, of course, freely solicit distant customers. 
Such efforts, however, lose effectiveness and eventually become 
insignificant as the distance from the potential customer increases, 
and the price of the goods and therefore the customer's potential sav-
ing decreases. 88 At the point where the retailer must relocate to 
make the distant sale, however, the location clause insidiously bars 
the way. On the wholesale end, in contrast, a territorial restraint 
is an absolute bar to intrabrand competition only if the manufacturer 
condemned as unreasonable under section 1 of the Sherman Act, but there is no 
obvious reason why it should be illlegal if what it requires of the wholesaler is 
permissible. Parke, Davis is not to the contrary because there the manufacturer 
sought to compel wholesalers to enforce an otherwise illegal scheme of resale price 
maintenance. Still, some might argue that a manufacturer must take the bitter with 
the sweet if it does not choose to assume the wholesaling function. But often the 
choice is mandated by what is financially or economically feasible. What reason is 
there to reward those who can make it or to punish those who cannot? 
84. See text at note 54-55 supra. 
85. See GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 997 (9th 
Cir.) (en bane), cert. granted, 91 S. a. 252 (1976). 
86. See 88 HARv. L. REV. 636, supra note 5, at 645 n.51. 
87. See GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 990 (9th 
Cir.) (en bane), cert. granted, 91 S. CL 252 (1976). 
88. Note, supra note 11, at 810. Furthermore, the expensive products that might 
attract distant customers may require service that local dealers are often reluctant to 
give at all or on equal terms with those who purchased from it. To overcome the fear 
of second-class local service or inconvenient distant service, the potential price saving 
may have to be even greater. 
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is prepared to stop dealing with offenders. Many manufacturers 
apparently were reluctant to do so, and instead merely ordered 
offenders to pay over a portion of their profits. 89 Thus, as a practi-
cal matter the territorial restraint is not always an absolute bar to com-
petition, and the location clause often is; efforts to distinguish the 
two restraints on this basis should fail. 
In one sense, however, the location clause may fulfill more 
compelling business needs than does the territorial restraint. 
Wholesalers who raid the territories of neighboring dealers are gen-
erally readily subject to retaliation in kind, since wholesalers as a 
class are mobile. Consequently many of them, in recognition of 
their mutual interdependence, will strive to keep the problem of 
cross-selling within manageable limits, in which effort the manufac-
turer may assist through the imposition of certain, generally lawful, 
restraints. 90 Such constraints are generally also effective in dampen-
ing retail competition through cross-advertising.91 They are ineffec-
tive, however, in preventing or controlling the effects of new 
locations. Retaliation in kind by invaded dealers is slow and often 
beyond the means of many, who are, therefore, the most likely vic-
tims; other available distributional restraints are not particularly 
effective in deterring the effort or in ameliorating its effect. 92 The 
real constraint upon new locations is the cost and risk involved, but 
that is neither solace to the dealer who has in fact been attacked, 
nor assurance to the prospective dealer who sees strong, expansion-
minded dealers nearby. In this situation, therefore, the location 
clause may be more important to retail distribution than the terri-
torial limitation is to wholesale distribution, and the former, there-
fore, arguably should not be condemned as per se unlawful, 
89. Id. at 814-15, 827. 
90. The grant of exclusive franchises, refusals to drop-ship into another's territo-
ry, and the use of reasonable profit passover or area of primary responsibility clauses 
will discourage cross-selling by wholesalers. 
91. The retailer who aggressively advertises in nearby localities is generally 
subject to ready retaliation in kind. Furthermore, it may be financing the effort in 
part with cooperative advertising funds, which the manufacturer may then limit. 
Finally, to the extent that one dealer is compelled to give service to those who 
purchase from another, the manufacturer can compensate him fully or provide for a 
profit passover in the case of prepaid service. Note, supra note 11, at 816. 
92. 88 HARV. L. REV. 636, supra note 5, 644 n.49. The Topco decree, however, 
approved a provision that required the invading dealer to compensate the other 
through a fixed-sum payment or profit passover for the goodwill for the product that 
the latter had cultivated. United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 1973 Trade Cas. 
93,797 (N.D. Ill.), affd., 414 U.S. 801 (1973). Such compensation arrangements 
must be reasonable. If they are based on sales by the new location, it must render an 
accounting. Of course, if the manufacturer supplies the new location directly, it 
could credit the account of the invaded dealer directly for each item shipped. See 
Note, supra note 11, at 814-15 n.74. 
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especially when used alone, just because the latter is. Otherwise, 
a manufacturer that requires new, nonexclusive03 retailers would be 
unable to promise them any significant territorial protection. 
If these distinctions suggest that the location clause should not 
be per se unlawful, they also suggest its use should be significantly 
limited only to new dealers, or perhaps only to nonexclusive new 
dealers, 94 for a limited time. 95 The anticompetitive effects are 
93. In marketing situations in which locational convenience is important to retail 
customers, the retailers might rationally be denied exclusive franchises even though 
such franchises were given to wholesalers serving them. Note, supra note 11, at 803. 
A retailer might then request a location clause in substitution for an exclusive 
franchise and plausibly contend that the choice between them should not face 
different legal consequences. Respondent's Brief for Certiorari at 14-15, Continental 
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 537 F.2d 980 (9th Cir.) (en bane), cert. granted, 91 
S. Ct. 252 (1976). There are two reasons why this argument should not be accepted. 
First, an analogous argument that could be made with respect to the choice between 
territorial restraints and exclusive franchises was effectively rejected by Sc/zwi1111. The 
obvious reason is that the exclusive franchise is technically not a restraint on 
alienation, whereas the alternatives are. See note 61 supra. Second, a manufacturer 
lawfully permitted to employ territorial restraints or location clauses alone might also 
grant de facto exclusive franchises and, therefore, de facto closed territories. See 
note 94 infra. The converse is, of course, not possible. 
94. Allowing the temporary use of the location clause in nonexclusive new-entry 
situations would actually be a minor concession. By definition some degree of 
intrabrand competition would exist. Furthermore, during that period the new entrant 
would presumably provide the area with sufficient additional capacity or locational 
convenience to discourage other dealers from locating there anyway, unless they 
undertook to drive it out of business. Barring such a possibility, the temporary use of 
location clauses may give the potential new entrant the assurance to undertake the 
dealership without significantly harming competition. 
A harder question is whether to permit a location clause to operate in favor of a 
new dealer who has no promise of exclusivity but who in fact enjoys it. A negative 
answer invites litigation over whether a territory is actually exclusive. Cf. Beacon 
Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959) (analogous antitrust litigation over 
whether one theatre was in competition with another and could, therefore, enjoy 
clearance over it). An affirmative answer means that de facto closed territories may 
exist temporarily at the retail level and invites manufacturers to conceal promises of 
exclusivity in order to offer them. It also invites litigation alleging such concealment 
by dealers barred from opening new locations. Although litigation either way will 
usually last longer than the temporary location clause that provokes it, it offers a 
treble damage payoff to any dealer who successfully undertakes it. Most such 
litigation could be eliminated if the manufacturer were permitted to couple an 
exclusive franchise with a location clause and offer the new dealer a temporary closed 
territory. But such a concession appears to be inconsistent with Sc/11vi1111. Of course 
Sc/zwi1111 never specifically ruled out the temporary use of territorial prohibitions, 
alone or in combination with an exclusive franchise in the new entry or failing 
company situations. See Zimmerman, supra note 6, at 1181. There is some reason 
to believe that eventually the Court will make this exception. Cf. United States v. 
Jerrold Elec. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), affd. per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 
(1961) (similar exception for tie-in sales). See generally note 4 supra. To the extent 
the Court does make this exception, it will presumably create a similar exemption for 
location clauses. To the extent it does not, however, the refusal need not apply 
equally to the location clause, which, I have argued, is partially distinguishable. See 
text at notes 90-96 supra. 
95. There are other problems of retail distribution for which the location clause 
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reduced since new entrants must still face interbrand competition. 
If eventually they cannot survive without protection from intrabrand 
competition, their departure from the market is not a significant loss; 
nor is it a serious social loss if, as a result, the manufacturer or a 
line of products is forced out of the market.96 
There is a second important reason to prohibit the unrestricted 
use of location clauses. It is generally assumed that distributional 
restraints deter only intrabrand competition, but this may not be true 
for location clauses. Because of changing distributional patterns and 
antitrust constraints on exclusive dealing, retailers today are far less 
likely to be single-brand outlets.97 Nevertheless, those retailers sub-
ject to a location clause with respect to some brands will undoubtedly 
consider that fact in choosing new locations. For example, in United 
States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 98 a large number of supermarket chains 
jointly established a private-label purchasing company, and each 
chain effectively agreed not to sell the private-label brand from new 
locations in the territory of the others. To the extent that this pro-
hibition affected each chain's choice of new locations, potential com-
petition among them with respect to the other brands they carried, 
obviously the major part of their business, was also restrained or 
eliminated. Indeed, because of the importance of the private-label 
brand, the location clauses there may have amounted to a noncom-
petition pact. 99 
Obviously, we should not permit one manufacturer to accomplish 
that which would ordinarily require the combined illegal efforts of 
a number of competing manufacturers or dealers. However, to evalu-
ate such effects of location clauses as these on a case-by-case, rule of 
reason basis, we must consider such factors as the importance of the 
brand subject to the location clause, the number of dealers of that 
brand within the territory, the number of other brands carried by 
the affected dealer, the number of these brands also affected by 
location clauses or other territorial restraints, and the duration of and 
would be an effective solution. I shall, however, suggest below that there are other, 
less restrictive means of achieving these ends. See text at notes 146-51. 
96. See Zimmerman, supra note o, at 1186. 
97. The large number of American automobile dealers who now also sell one or 
more makes of foreign cars is perhaps the best illustration of this trend. 
98. 405 U.S. 596 (1972). 
99. Such a result was not unlikely, although the participants claimed otherwise, 
because of testimony that private-label sales were profitable, popular, and needed to 
compete with the largest chains, which were able to undertake efficient private-label 
programs individually. 405 U.S. at 599 n.3, 600. 
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justification for the location clause in question. To describe the 
scope of the inquiry is to show its impossibility.10° Furthermore, 
legality could then vary from one retailer to another, 101 as well as 
from one brand to another. The game would not be worth the 
candle; consequently, location clauses should be generally outlawed, 
subject to some exception for new entrants. 
The preceeding discussion is clearly at odds with the recent en 
bane opinion of the Ninth Circuit in GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continen-
tal T.V., Inc.102 Although the opinion holds only that location 
clauses are not per se unlawful, it places no significant limitations 
on their use, posits no criteria for measuring their reasonableness, 
and in effect suggests that they are, like exclusive franchises, per 
se reasonable. 103 Furthermore, although the court's opinion recog-
ioo. The Supreme Court has said, with regard to the use of the per se rule in 
other contexts, that it "avoids the necessity for an incredibly complicated and 
prolonged economic investigation . . . an inquiry so often wholly fruitless when 
undertaken." Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). 
101. The suggestion that location clauses be permitted to operate only in favor of 
new dealers obviously also means that their legality will vary from one dealer to 
another. In that case, however, the manufacturer would presumably employ some 
uniform time period for all new entrants, and after some initial litigation as to what is 
reasonable, the standards developed should be sufficiently clear to discourage pro-
longed litigation. 
102. 537 F.2d 980 (9th Cir.) (en bane), cert. granted, 91 S. Ct. 252 (1976). 
103. The majority makes much of the fact that in 1962, when Sylvania undertook 
restricted distribution, its market share had fallen and it had reached or was 
approaching the point where it might have to abandon the market altogether. See 
537 F.2d at 991. Consequently its status as a "failing" company entitled it, like a 
new entrant, to use the restraints for a reasonable period. See Sandura Co. v. FTC, 
339 F.2d 847, 850-53 (6th Cir. 1964). However, such a period should last no longer 
than the emergency that gives rise to it. See United States v. Jerrold Blee. Corp., 187 
F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), affd. per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961). The majority, 
like the Sixth Circuit in Sandura, makes no inquiry into whether the emergency 
continued in 1965, does not suggest that the burden is on the company to show its 
continuance, and ignores substantial evidence that it had indeed ended. In fact, when 
Sylvania's dispute with plaintiff began in 1965, its market share had risen to five per 
cent, and in the majority's own words, it "had emerged as a vigorous competitor 
ranking as the nation's eighth largest manufacturer and seller of color television sets." 
537 F.2d at 984. Arguably the emergency was over then, as some of the dissenters 
had argued in the initial majority panel discussion. See 1914-1 Trade Cas. 96,796. 
See generally Note, 1975 DuKE L.J. 935, supra note 5, at 949 n.88. 
As an answer to this argument, some would note that it is obviously very difficult 
to determine when an emergency has ended and that courts, therefore, should 
hesitate to find that once-lawful restraints were terminated a few months or a year 
too late, if the consequence is liability for huge treble damages. This answer, while 
essentially persuasive, must be qualified. First, even if damages were awarded in this 
situation, they should arguably only cover the excess time period. Second, if Sylvania 
had been relying on the existence of such an emergency to justify its restraints, then 
it should have been aware of the possibility that the emergency had ended when it 
deliberately terminated its relationship with plaintiff. Finally, when the trial court's 
injunction against further enforcement by Sylvania of its location clauses was issued 
almost a decade later, the emergency or the dispensation had surely ended. Thus in 
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nizes that Sylvania was not also granting exclusive franchises, 104 it 
states that a combination of the two restraints is natural and reason-
able.100 Thus, it would apparently allow closed territories at retail, 
even though they are prohibited by Schwinn at wholesale, and it 
effectively gives back to many retailers what Congress the same year 
took away by scuttling the fair trade laws.106 
These anomalous results occur in Sylvania without acknowledge-
ment, let alone explanation. This is perhaps understandable be-
cause the opinion is largely drawn from the published criticisms of 
Schwinn and the initial decision in Sylvania, and, like its precursors, 
it is apparently not anxious to spell out the full implications of its 
holding. Since the opinion adds nothing new to the argument of 
Schwinn's critics, which I have sought to challenge at length here, 
I shall otherwise leave it to the tender mercies of the law reviews, 
which to date have unfortunately also tended to follow without ques-
tion the prevailing critical orthodoxy. 
its failure in 1976 to limit, or to discuss limits upon, a giant conglomerate corpora-
tion that arguably had special needs in 1962, the majority suggests a policy of virtu-
ally no limits on per se reasonableness. Furthermore, in its failure to make any 
inquiry into the needs or the competitive situation of the dealer Sylvania sought to 
protect, it suggests that Sylvania could protect all dealers, including powerful, well-
established chains. 
104. 537 F.2d at 983. The dissent, however, notes that the invaded dealer 
accounted for all of the sales of Sylvania color television sets (and most of the black 
and white ones) in Sacramento in 1965. 537 F.2d at 1010. One wonders how many 
more large cities like Sacramento effectively had only one Sylvania dealer. For a 
discussion of the legality of combining de facto exclusive franchises with location 
clauses, see note 94 supra. 
105. The majority argues strenuously that 
[i]f it is legal for a manufacturer to promise one dealer that he will have the 
exclusive right to sell the manufacturer's products within a designated territory, 
then obviously it is legal for that manufacturer to keep his promise of exclusiv-
ity by denying other dealers like Continental the power to sell from retail outlets 
at unauthorized locations within the first dealer's exclusive territory. 
537 F.2d at 997. This conclusion is not compelled by the usual language of contracts 
granting exclusive franchises nor by inescapable logic. A standard, exclusive-fran-
chise contract, it must be remembered, does not require a manufacturer to intervene 
should the exclusive franchisee's territory be invaded, nor does it include any 
provision that restricts other dealers. See note 35 supra. Thus, so long as the 
manufacturer does not directly sell to other purchasers in the exclusive franchisee's 
territory, it is not in violation of its contract. Further, it can be argued that, in some 
instances, it may be unlawful for the manufacturer to refuse to provide an invading 
dealer located elsewhere with goods it would sell in the exclusive franchisee's 
territory. See note 82 supra. However, a court adopting the assertion of the 
majority in Sylvania will generally accept as lawful the use of both location and 
exclusive franchise clauses, and, therefore, permit closed territories. 
106. See generally Comanor, supra note 8, at 1427. Closed territories may have 
more serious effects than resale price fixing because they also prevent nonprice 
intrabrand competition. Furthermore, the price chosen by a retailer protected from 
competition by a closed territory will often exceed but should never fall short of the 
price the manufacturer would choose under a fair trade or price fixing arrangement. 
P. AREEDA, supra note 30, at 500.01. 
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II. THE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR DISTRIBUTIONAL RESTRAINTS 
The nonrestrictive purposes of, or justifications for, distributional 
restraints have already been examined extensively in the litera-
ture107 and do not require lengthy explication here. Essentially, 
vertical restraints are useful in facilitating three basic goals of suc-
cessful distribution: the recruitment of new dealers, the provision 
of dealer services thought necessary to market the product effec-
tively, and the proper exploitation of each dealer's sales territory.108 
In considering each goal separately, this section will show that a 
variety of restraints, with varying degrees of anticompetitive effect, 
are available to the manufacturer seeking to attain a particular goal. 
A. The Recruitment of New Dealers 
Economic theory suggests that new investment should occur 
whenever the prospective rate of return exceeds the opportunity cost 
of capital, which is presumed to include a premium for risk and un-
certainty .100 Since distributional restraints are designed to raise the 
prospective return or to reduce the risk of investment, they should 
attract an even higher level of investment in distribution than other-
wise. 110 Such artificial stimulation of capital investment in excess 
of the socially optimal level, however, is hardly a customary goal of 
antitrust policy. One reason for the tender regard for it in the ver-
tical context is that distributional restraints are most effective in the 
marketing of differentiable goods through franchises.m Such fac-
tors, however, tend to raise entry barriers and to concentrate such 
markets at the manufacturing level.112 To enter them, a manufac-
turer must recruit good dealers quickly in order to increase sales and 
thereby lower its unit costs of production and of advertising and 
promotion.113 In addition, the dealers' efforts to promote the 
107. See, e.g., Comanor, supra note 8; Zimmerman, supra note 6; Note, supra note 
11. 
108. Comanor notes as additional justification the "free ride" and price discrimi-
nation problems. See Comanor, supra note 8, at 1432-33. The former problem will 
be discussed in the section on provision of dealer services. See text at notes 129-37 
infra. The latter is not discussed because it raises concerns peripheral to this 
article. 
109. Comanor, supra note 8, at 1428. 
110. Id. at 1429. 
111. Id. at 1428. 
112. J. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION 114-43 (1956). 
113. Id. A manufacturer that erects a plant of optimal size will presumably not 
achieve the lowest possible unit costs at substantially less than full capacity opera-
tions. Id. at 53. Meanwhile, it must pay the debt service costs attributable to the 
unused capacity. 
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product and develop goodwill for it should help to overcome any 
product differentiation barrier. 
Thus, the use of distributional restraints to facilitate new entry 
into concentrated manufacturing markets, even at the temporary 
expense of intrabrand competition in the new product, may represent 
a reasonable tradeoff.114 In effect, however, each new entrant em-
ploying vertical restraints is being permitted to fight fire with fire, 
and care must be taken lest one prematurely burns the bridges for 
subsequent entrants.115 Furthermore, manufacturers that build the 
proverbial better mousetrap will presumably attract dealers even 
without such added inducements, whereas those that obviously have 
not will presumably fail in any case. The majority of entrants fall 
between these two extremes, and they should be able to succeed if 
they can temporarily give new dealers some reasonable level of pro-
tection. A larger dispensation should be necessary only for those 
entrants whose prospects are otherwise unpromising, and whose exit 
from the market represents no societal loss. 
There are no simple solutions, however, to the problem of 
determining who may claim the exemption and for what time period. 
It is accurate but not very helpful to say that those able to 
demonstrate legitimate, temporary needs will be permitted to use an 
otherwise unlawful restraint or package of them for a limited period 
of time. Fortunately, more specificity can be obtained by examining 
some typical situations. One such situation involves true new entry 
by a dealer or distributor, which may make a substantial investment 
in plant, equipment, and inventory, and incur considerable advertis-
ing and promotional expenses. There are two crucial determinants 
here: The first is the length of time this new entrant should require 
to show a profit or to achieve normal profits; and the second is the 
additional time it needs to recover enough of its startup costs to make 
the initial investment attractive.116 These considerations should sug-
gest some reasonable time period, roughly approximated in years or 
substantial fractions thereof, during which a manufacturer can law-
fully impose restraints uniformly on all such new dealers, and to 
114. Zimmerman, supra note 6, at 1186. Schwinn noted the possibility of an 
exception for new entrants or failing companies, but declined to rule on it. 388 U.S. 
at 374. 
115. A new entrant is being assisted in the creation of product differentiation and 
a dealer network, the very things that those already in the market used to create the 
entry barriers that necessitate this assistance. Thus, there is the danger that the new 
entrant will surmount these barriers, join those already behind them, and in the 
process raise entry barriers even higher. 
116. See note 135 infra. 
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which the courts should accord some latitude in reviewing its reason-
ableness. 
Other factors will of course affect the calculation of the period 
or our perception of its reasonableness. The intensity of interbrand 
competition117 and the anticipated intensity of intrabrand competition 
after the exemption terminates118 are two obvious considerations. 
Another is the situation of the manufacturer. If it is a new entrant 
into manufacturing, it must recruit many dealers rapidly, for which 
need some allowance should perhaps be made. If, however, it is 
entering a new product or geographic market, or is merely adding 
new dealers in existing markets, its need for haste may be less and 
its bargaining position with dealers may be stronger. In addition, 
the dealer's risk and attendant needs may be reduced.110 On the 
other hand, a single new dealer may be justifiably apprehensive of 
intrabrand competition from established neighboring dealers and 
may require a longer period of insulation. 
Another typical situation involves the recruitment of established 
dealers to handle a new product or product line. Their capital out-
lays should be smaller, and often so should their outlays for adver-
tising and promotion.120 Indeed, they may well be satisfied with ex-
clusive franchises and some protection against "free riding" by neigh-
boring dealers. 121 If they must invest substantial time, effort, and 
money in developing the territory, however, they understandably 
wish to enjoy alone the first fruits of their efforts and are fearful 
that intrabrand competition might drive down markups before the 
profit corner has been turned and some portion of the initial invest-
117. Intensive interbrand competition should hold down the price of competing or 
·substitute products, which should in turn limit the price of the product in question 
despite the use of vertical restraints. This might not be true if the product in 
question enjoys substantial differentiated market power, the existence of which would, 
of course, limit or negate any claimed exemption. 
118. If vigorous intrabrand competition is not anticipated at the termination of the 
exemption period, either because of natural factors such as high transporation costs, 
or because of the manufacturer's selection of nonaggressive dealers, its award of 
exclusive franchises, or its wide geographical spacing of dealers, the exemption should 
perhaps be limited. Conversely, when vigorous postexemption competition is antici-
pated, the exemption could be appropriately extended. 
119. A dealer taking on a brand established in other markets may still have to 
make extensive capital outlays, for which some protection may properly be sought. 
But its prospects for success are greater and the need for advertising and promotion 
may be less. 
120. On the one hand, illustratively, a wholesale supply house may be able simply 
to feature the new product in its catalog or showroom. On the other hand, a new or 
different kind of product may require, among other things, extensive advertising and 
promotion, outlays for inventory and spare parts, and the training of service person-
nel. 
121. See text at notes 129-30 infra. 
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ment has been recovered. Thus, the nature of the calculation of 
any reasonable exemption period here is similar to that in the first 
example, but its duration should, in most cases, be shorter. 
The last and most difficult situation is one in which an established 
manufacturer finds that its competitive position is declining or failing. 
That fact alone may not justify an exemption, but together with other 
factors, it might. Two cases are instructive here. In Sandura Co. 
v. FTC,122 the record showed that the company had almost been 
forced into bankruptcy by product failures. After solving this prob-
lem, Sandura had to undertake a substantial advertising campaign, 
which it could not alone afford, to regain its market image and posi-
tion. It therefore offered closed territories to dealers willing to help 
finance the campaign. The Federal Trade Commission and the 
Sixth Circuit both concluded that such dealer efforts, which seem 
indistinguishable from those discussed above, properly earned an ex-
emption.123 The Sixth Circuit, however, reversed the Commission's 
finding that the exemption period had expired, concluding that it 
should run indefinitely because substantial dealer advertising would 
otherwise terminate. That conclusion was, in my opinion, both 
factually and legally erroneous.124 
The second illustrative case is G.T.E. Sylvania Inc. v. Continen-
tal T.V., Inc. 125 There the company's market position had declined, 
but reasons for it were not given, and the cure apparently did not 
involve either dealer expenditures or recruitment. Indeed, t(? imple-
ment the company's "elbow room policy," some dealerships may 
have been terminated in order to give the remaining ones ample ter-
ritorial separation. Location clauses were then imposed upon the 
remaining dealers in return, apparently, for their promises not to dis-
continue handling the company's television sets and perhaps for 
promises to push them. There is a serious doubt whether this situa-
122. 339 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1964). 
123. See 339 F.2d at 855-59. 
124. Continuing advertising and promotional outlays are marginal costs, which 
dealers will rationally include in price determinations made even in situations of 
intense price rivalry. See note 135 infra. No facts were offered to show that 
Sandura dealers were unable to recover such costs. If the problem was "free riding" 
by some dealers who did not advertise widely, Sandura could have required minimum 
advertising outlays or levels proportionate to sales. Once the success of its improved 
product was assured, it presumably could have done this without suffering large-scale 
dealer defections. If it could not, its comeback clearly must have failed, and it lacked 
any excuse for further immunity. 
125. GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980 (9th Cir.) (en 
bane), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 252 (1976). For a more detailed discussion of the 
relevant facts, see note 103 supra. 
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tion justifies an exemption, 126 for the dealers apparently made no 
substantial new investment, outlays, or efforts. Furthermore, this 
type of situation does not seem to offer the guidelines that would 
permit calculation of a reasonable exemption period. Finally, de-
fendant apparently did not lack other options;127 it appears that 
Sylvania simply chose the cheapest and easiest one-vertical re-
straints in return for dealer commitment. If a large conglomerate 
corporation could make this choice in the face of adversity, who 
could not? Arguably more concern should be shown for a small, 
struggling firm fu a concentrated market where entry is difficult, 
and perhaps enforcement agencies should briefly look the other way 
while it tries. Thereafter, it might even be preferable if the company 
left the market or were forced to sell out to others better able to 
run it.12s 
B. The Provision of Services 
A manufacturer may believe that the provision by dealers of 
certain services, some of which are expensive, is essential to the 
effective marketing of its products.129 Each dealer, however, would 
presumably choose to provide only those services its market would 
profitably support. Some dealers, knowing that others nearby are 
providing expensive services like showrooms or repair facilities 
that are available to everyone's customers, might not provide these 
services, and might instead pass on the savings in the form of lower 
prices that attract sales away from dealers providing services. As 
a result, these dealers might eventually be forced to lower the level 
of services they provide.130 Such "free-rider" problems131 can be 
126. Needless to say, this conclusion would not affect the result in the case unless 
Sylvania's use of location clauses was otherwise unlawful. 
127. For example, Sylvania might have begun a new advertising or promotional 
campaign, which presumably it was financially able to undertake. 
128. Obviously, the temporazy loss of intrabrand competition is preferable to the 
company's failure or its acquisition as a failing company by a competitor if no other 
purchaser can be found. But there is no guarantee that the loss will be temporary 
and no justification for accepting it indefinitely. Furthermore, in the face of the 
difficulty of rationalizing and defining such an exemption, it seems wiser to reject it 
officially and to rely on prosecutorial discretion for partial implementation. 
129. The manufacturer may desire that dealers have expensive showrooms or 
display facilities, carry a full line of inventozy, advertise or otherwise promote the 
product, or provide service or installation facilities and carzy the necessary parts. 
Note, supra note 11, at 806-08. For example, it was estimated in 1962 that the cost 
of opening a metropolitan automobile dealership supplying such services was between 
$600,000 and $1,000,000. Id. 
130. Some services like repair facilities, which charge customers separately, may 
not raise the dealer's prices and are not, therefore, necessarily vulnerable to free 
riding, as are other services like elaborate showrooms. 
131. See Comanor, supra note 8, at 1432; Posner, supra note 6, at 285. 
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eliminated if all dealers provide a uniform level of services. If they 
cannot be persuaded by the manufacturer to do so, a service require-
ment could be made a condition to obtaining the franchise, 132 or, 
alternatively, the manufacturer could provide the services itself.133 
Often, however, a manufacturer cannot afford to provide all of them 
itself, 134 and although many dealers could make up the difference, 
they will be reluctant to do so without protection from intrabrand 
competition necessary to secure the high markups required to permit 
recovery of the substantial fixed costs of some of these services.135 
Thus, such protection is often the quid pro quo for mandatory dealer 
services, 136 or the necessary incentive for those provided voluntarily .137 
It may initially seem surprising that a manufacturer would seek 
to compel the provision of expensive services in excess of what the 
market will support, and that its products can compete at the result-
ing higher prices against other brands not so burdened.138 The only 
132. See Note, supra note 11, at 806-08. 
133. For example, an increasing number of appliance manufacturers now provide 
their own repair facilities. See id. at 807-08 n.52. 
134. See, e.g., Sandura Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1964). 
135. To the extent that the market will not support the level of services demanded 
by the manufacturer, the dealers obviously will not supply them unless the manufac-
turer pays the difference or the restraints permit supracompetitive returns. But a 
problem exists even when competitive returns will support the services. Some 
services, like expensive showrooms or repair facilities, involve fixed costs; others, like 
advertising, involve variable costs. In the short run, a dealer can profitably sell at 
any price above marginal cost, which is affected by variable costs but not by fixed 
costs. To recover the latter, the long-run price must equal the average or fully 
distributed cost. An intrabrand price war that reduces price below average cost may 
then prevent dealers from recovering fixed costs, even though all have uniformly 
incurred them. Consequently, dealers may refuse to provide such services unless their 
markups are protected long enough to recover all or most of the associated fixed 
costs. This is, however, primarily an entry problem, and it should presumably be a 
consideration in the determination of the extent and duration of the restraints needed 
to encourage it. 
136. Note, supra note 11, at 808-09. 
137. Professor Posner has demonstrated that dealers subject to resale price 
maintenance would automatically engage in nonprice competition and spend any 
excess profits for the provision of services. Posner, supra note 6, at 284-85. This 
would not necessarily be true for dealers protected by territorial restraints, who could 
either pocket the excess profits or employ them in interbrand competition to finance 
services or engage in price wars. These dealers must be required by the manufacturer 
to provide the services in return for the protection provided. 
138. Of this result, Professor Comanor has written: 
Vertical restrictions, which encourage dealers to provide customer services 
jointly with the manufacturer's product at a single price, are thus likely to re-
sult in the provision of more of these services than would be the case if con-
sumers were free to purchase them separately from the manufactured products. 
This arrangement is likely also to lead to a joint price which is higher than the 
sum of the two prices which would be set were the commodities priced sepa-
rately. 
Comanor, supra note 8, at 1430. 
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answer is that the services will help to differentiate the product suffi-
ciently to insulate it from the lower prices of others.130 The acquisi-
tion of such market power is a benefit to the manufacturer and its 
dealers, who will normally join voluntarily in efforts to achieve it140 
so long as free-rider problems are minimized. It is not necessarily 
in the public interest, however, and, therefore, hardly a reason to 
excuse the restraints that make it possible. 
Established manufacturers, admittedly, can themselves provide 
enough services to create promotional product differentiation.141 
The inevitability of some such differentiation, however, does not jus-
tify its general encouragement. In any event, even small manufac-
turers can and do provide some services themselves and demand 
or encourage the provision of others by their dealers. Manufacturers 
can, furthermore, employ various lawful devices and restraints to 
minimize the possibility that some dealers will try to gain a free ride 
on the services provided by others, yet not substantially reduce intra-
brand compeition.142 Finally, manufacturers can facilitate the recov-
ery of the fixed cost of certain expensive services by the temporary 
use of additional restraints during the entry period. 143 Beyond this, 
high fixed costs have generally not caused ruinous competition in 
other markets. 144 So there is no reason to expect that result in dis-
tribution. Indeed, this excuse for restraints has elsewhere been uni-
formly rejected.145 
The manufacturer's desire here to induce or compel dealers to 
provide services is obviously complicated by the per se illegality of 
139. See id.; Zimmerman, supra note 6, at 1184-85. 
140. See id. at 1183-85. 
141. Some commentators argue that established manufacturers can and might 
integrate forward into distribution in order to accomplish lawfully that which the 
antitrust Jaws otherwise do not permit. That argument has been generally rejected 
for good reasons. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 315-21 
(1949) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Distribution has many characteristics that make 
such activity unattractive to manufacturers. Comanor, supra note 8, at 1435-36. 
Consequently, few have integrated forward as a response to antitrust prohibitions. Sec 
Zimmerman, supra note 6, at 1186-87. 
142. See note 131 supra. For example, competing dealers of disparate size could 
be required to advertise at levels proportionate to their sales. Zimmerman, supra note 
6, at 1184-85. To avoid the problem of prepaid services for installation or warranty 
repair, these costs could be charged separately or the dealer performing the work 
could be compensated through a profit passover arrangement. In fact, one court 
decree allowed a profit passover arrangement that would generally compensate a 
dealer for the goodwill shared with another's new location. United States v. Topco 
Assoc., Inc., 1973 Trade Cas. 93,797 (N.D. Ill.), affd. per curiam, 414 U.S. 801 
(1973). 
143. See note 135 supra. 
144. See P . .AREEDA, supra note 30, at 270. 
145. See, e.g., United States v. Joint-Traffic Assn., 171 U.S. 505 (1898). 
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customer clauses and perhaps of location clauses, because it cannot 
influence or control new dealers or locations established without its 
approval. It can circumvent the customer clause problem by assum-
ing the wholesaling function itself or perhaps by transforming the 
wholesalers into agents or consignees under the Schwinn excep-
tion.146 Alternatively, it might be able to prohibit wholesalers from 
dealing with any retailer that refuses to provide certain minimum ser-
vices.147 It could circumvent both the customer and location clause 
problems by accepting such new outlets or locations as authorized 
dealers and bringing them within its influence. These tactics will not 
be helpful with respect to new locations with which the manufacturer 
cannot deal directly148 or with unfranchised retail outlets that 
occasionally acquire inventory, often excess or dated, from dealers 
or distributors. 149 The latter, though annoying to authorized dealers, 
are usually not serious competitive factors. The former may be, but 
as branches of authorized dealers with established goodwill, they 
should ordinarily meet minimal requirements voluntarily. Admit-
tedly, the manufacturer might be forced to change certain prac-
tices150 or to assume additional services itself to prevent "free 
riding," but such changes should not be so difficult or oppressive as 
to cast doubt upon a decision to outlaw customer and location clauses 
in the first place. 151 
146. See note 6 supra. 
147. This could be considered a restraint on alienation, but if a manufacturer 
dealing directly with retailers can impose and enforce such requirements, it should be 
able to require wholesalers to do the same thing. But see United States v. Parke, 
Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960). The only difference is a technical one. The 
manufacturer chooses not to deal, whereas the wholesaler is compelled by agreement 
not to deal, which constitutes in effect a restraint on alienation. 
148. Direct dealing with a new location in a territory to which the manufacturer 
has granted an exclusive franchise may constitute a breach of the exclusive contract. 
See note 82 supra. 
149. See note 54 supra. 
150. Sometimes retail prices include the cost of installation or warranty service. 
Manufacturers may then use a profit-passover arrangement to compensate a dealer, 
other than the seller, which performs such services. In other situations, manufactur-
ers sometimes do not fully compensate dealers for performing such services. These 
problems are exacerbated when some sellers are not authorized dealers. The manu-
facturer accordingly may be compelled to permit dealers to charge for all such 
services separately or may have to compensate them fully. See generally Note, supra 
note 11, at 812. 
151. For a discussion of the reasons for outlawing the location clause, see text at 
notes 71-106 supra. The reasons for condemning customer clauses have been summed 
up by Zimmerman: 
On the issue of the utility of restrictions in encouraging the dealers to provide 
special promotion and service, or the importance of customer restrictions in 
enabling the manufacturer to preserve the integrity of its own promotional efforts 
to stress the distinctive quality of the product, at least two observations are 
pertinent. Often the nature of the manufacturer's interest in avoidance of 
304 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 75:275 
C. Assuring the Proper Exploitation of a Territory 
A manufacturer's sales can be maximized only if dealers seek 
out and serve every potential customer. The dealers, however, will 
presumably only make sales where marginal revenue equals or ex-
ceeds marginal cost. Thus, they will not serve some high-cost cus-
tomers. On the other hand, the cost of attracting or serving other 
customers will be low; theoretically, these customers should receive 
a lower price reflecting these savings, but often they do not.1G2 
These high-margin customers may eventually become the target of 
other dealers, who seek to "skim" this "cream" from their neighbor's 
business.153 In a competitive model, such warfare should eventually 
eliminate these high margins. It may also, however, upset dealer 
harmony and involve the manufacturer, who would prefer that 
dealers devote their excess energies to interbrand competition and to 
the obtaining of new customers in their immediate sales areas. For 
these reasons, manufacturers often seek ways to compel dealers to sow 
their own fields in preference to reaping fields sown by neighboring 
dealers. 
One way to accomplish this is through the imposition of territorial 
restraints to insulate high-margin sales in return for each dealer's 
promise to serve high-cost customers within its territory. Unfor-
tunately, such objectives are not cost free. In effect, the manufac-
turer is seeking to create or to perpetrate, through the elimination 
or restriction of intrabrand competition, a system of economic price 
discrimination whereby monopoly profits realized on sales to some 
customers are used to subsidize sales to new, otherwise unprofitable, 
customers.154 Although the manufacturer benefits, it does so at the 
resale by non-prestigious outlets is cloaked in ambiguity; it may correspond 
closely to little other than an effort to avoid the outbreak of "disruptive" price 
competition. Certainly most discount houses are reputable, if not elegant, these 
days, and the asserted damage to the image of a product from sales by such 
establishments may be no more than a puncturing of an inflated claim to an 
inflated price. Moreover, to the extent that dealer or producer efforts to dis-
tinguish the brand by intensive sales and servicing efforts do enhance the brand's 
competitive stance, the nature of this particular type of competitive enhancement 
must be reckoned with. The elimination of intrabrand competition results in 
a diminution in price competition, interbrand as well as intrabrand. If, as is 
too often the case, the manufacturing segment of the industry is concentrated, 
the further product differentiation which may be encouraged by the restric-
tions-the alleged benefit-serves largely to help transfer oligopolistic behavior 
to the distribution level and to encourage interbrand "product" competition at 
the expense of price competition. And while genuine product competition is not 
to be scorned, the very need for restrictions to secure it here suggests that it is 
to be provided in quantity and intensity that the market, left untrammeled, docs 
not want. · 
Zimmerman, supra note 6, at 1185. 
152. Comanor, supra note 8, at 1430. 
153. Note, supra note 11, at 811. 
154. Comanor, supra note 8, at 1431. 
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expense of the public interest through price discrimination and 
resource misallocation.155 
Needless to say, a manufacturer has a legitimate interest in the 
reasonable exploitation of each assigned territory. It may, however, 
promote this interest by contractually assigning each dealer an area 
of primary responsibility, and, if necessary, by requiring territorial 
sales quotas.166 There is, further, no legitimate interest in preventing 
most "cream skimming," which is only a manifestation of competi-
tion. In some instances it may seem unfair that, after one dealer 
has made a significant effort to sell to a high-cost customer, another 
dealer free rides on the former's preselling effort and expense.157 
If all dealers are required to provide the same essential services and 
efforts, however, these instances should tend to offset each other. 
In special situations, the manufacturer could employ a profit-passover 
arrangement. 158 
D. An Overview of the Justifications 
Having considered these justifications separately, let us now 
examine them collectively. Vertical restraints are often legitimately 
directed at problems inherent in the distribution process, but as a 
general matter, as this section has shown, the less restrictive re-
straints are adequate to deal with them. Although vertical restraints 
can strengthen the competitive stance of those using them, too often 
this strengthening comes principally from the acquisition or retention 
of promotional differentiated market power that will contribute to 
interbrand competition primarily in the sense that another firm par-
ticipates in a shared monopoly.159 Thus, there is no necessarily 
direct correspondence here between benefits to particular brands 
and consumer welfare. 
These are not simply theoretical observations. In leading cases 
like White Motor, Schwinn and GTE Sylvania, the apparent purpose 
of the restraints, which were essentially permanent, was the acquisi-
tion or preservation of promotional differentiated market power. 
Each company, to be sure, faced significant competitive pressures 
to which these tactics were presumably a response. None could jus-
tify the extraordinary measures allegedly required for its survival, 
155. Id. 
156. See Zimmerman, supra note 6, at 1181, 1185. 
157. Note, supra note 11, at 811. 
158. Id. at 815-16. 
159. The theory and potential consequences of shared monopoly are discussed in 
P. AREEDA, supra note 30, at 1186. 
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however, except in terms of the potential loss of a competitor in an 
already concentrated market. Although this is the very reason for 
the new entry or failing company exception, it cannot justify the 
indefinite protection of those who have had their chance and cannot 
otherwise make it, 100 unless we incorporate into the antitrust laws 
a rather bizarre notion of free enterprise. 
Curiously, although these points were carefully made by others 
a decade ago, 161 their merits have largely been ignored by Schwinn's 
critics, who merely acknowledge the existence of an opposite point 
of view and continue to recite the familiar litany of justifications. 
Apparently they believe that empirical or theoretical refutation of the 
anticompetitive effects of vertical restraints is unnecessary, and that 
as long as there is an apparent difference of opinion among experts 
over the need for and the net effect of such practices, it cannot be 
concluded that they are, on the whole, overwhelmingly bad or only 
sporadically good, which is supposedly the sine qua non of per se 
illegality.162 
It is this conclusion to which I demur. Since the restrictive 
aspects of these practices are inferrable, the burden should be on 
those who use them to establish the countervailing competitive gains. 
If the courts cannot realistically measure their net effects or even 
muster the resources to attempt such a measurement, then they may 
surely adopt, under the general language of the Sherman Act, bright-
line tests that give a decent measure of respect to the interests of 
both sides. This is in fact the lesson of Schwinn, regardless of the 
language of the opinion, and it should not be abandoned as a solution 
unless the balance struck was unfair or a superior approach is 
possible. 
ill. CONCLUSION 
The preceding discussion of the effects of and justifications for 
vertical restraints should confirm the judgment that a full rule of 
reason approach to their legality would frequently require an expen-
sive, prolonged exercise in futility. Furthermore, it is not unlikely 
that judges regularly faced with such impossible tasks would begin 
to decide cases on the basis of various unarticulated preferences, 
prejudices, or rules of thumb. The simplest of these would be to 
resolve doubts against the government as the party with the burden 
160. Zimmerman, supra note 6, at 1186. 
161. See note 107 supra. 
162. See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 4, at 279-80. 
December 1976] Vertical Distributional Restraints 307 
of proof, or, conversely, against the defendant as the party with the 
burden of justification.163 If these simple approaches failed to yield 
a result, the courts presumably would then have to examine struc-
tural market factors such as concentration and size distribution, the 
degree of product differentiation, and the prevalence of such 
restraints among the largest firms.164 The final question that merits 
discussion, then, is whether such a structural or "truncated" rule of 
reason approach, 165 which others have recommended,166 would be 
superior to the partial per se test that Schwinn mandates. 
At first glance, a structural approach has the the two obvious ad-
vantages of being less arbitrary than a per se standard and yet not 
requiring the involved inquiry of the rule of reason. There are 
potential disadvantages to such an approach, however. It will not 
yield predictable results unless it is limited to a small number of 
factors or variables, which, in turn, means that it will normally reveal 
very little about the actual performance of specific markets, 167 and 
at best can only identify those deserving more attention.168 Indeed, 
it may be fair to characterize such an approach as a coverup for the 
implementation of rather crude, result-oriented biases, which seems 
to make it less satisfactory than a straight forward, albeit arbitrary, 
rule. Of course, the number of variables to be -considered, and it 
is hoped, the accuracy of the analysis, could be expanded consider-
ably. At some stage, however, the scope of the inquiry and the un-
163. This approach is recommended in Note, supra note 11, at 823-32, which 
carefully measures the manufacturer's legitimate needs and accepts only the least 
restrictive restraint that will effectuate them. 
164. See id. at 832-34. 
165. Such an approach is associated primarily with merger and exclusive dealing 
cases under the Clayton Act. See notes 17-18 supra. However, there is no barrier to 
its use under the Sherman Act. Otherwise the validity of more drastic tests like the 
per se rule, especially in its application to tie-in arrangements not governed by the 
Clayton Act, would also be drawn into question. Cf. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United 
States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958). 
166. See note 19 supra. 
167. There is increasing empirical evidence suggesting that even in cross-sectional 
industry studies, it is difficult to find significant correlations between selected market 
structure and market performance variables. See N. CoLLINS & L. PRESTON, CoN-
CENIRATION AND PRICE-Cosr MARGINS IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 1-5 (1968). 
The likelihood of correlation, let alone accurate predictions about market performance, 
for a particular market, is far less. 
168. Kaysen, Comment to Scitovsky, Economic Theory and the Measurement of 
Concentration, in NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, BUSINESS CONCEN-
TRATION AND PRICE POLICY 117 (1955). Indeed, there is growing doubt in general 
that structural analysis will yield accurate predictions about the performance of 
specific markets or the results of specific practices. See generally H. GoLDSCHMID, 
H. MANN & J. WESTON, supra note 20. 
308 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 75:275 
predictability of its outcome will resemble a full rule of reason 
approach.169 
Some compromise between these two formulations of the struc-
tural approach must obviously be found and articulated with 
sufficient clarity to provide predictable, consistent results, and not ad 
hoc responses. This can be accomplished if the standard contains 
a built-in bias against the government or the defendant as the party 
with the burden of proof or justification, respectively.17° A pre-
sumption against the government, however, would invite the use of 
vertical restraints, thereby overtaxing enforcement resources; a pre-
sumption against defendants, alternatively, would probably produce 
results similar to those required by Schwinn's partial per se ap-
proach.171 Consequently, a compromise acceptable to both sides 
would require a neutral standard flexible enough for accuracy, but 
limited enough for economy and predictability. 
In my opinion, there are two principal reasons why no compro-
mise structural standard can be articulated for distributional restraints 
to match the results achieved with this approach in merger cases or 
under the merger guidelines promulgated by the Department of J us-
tice.172 First, although guidelines for the use of each restraint in-
dividually could presumably be drafted, they would also have to deal 
with the use of these restraints in various combinations. The intro-
duction of this variable, not present in merger cases, would obviously 
complicate the formulation of guidelines enormously, just as it would 
undermine the precedential value of factually dissimilar cases de-
cided under such standards. Indeed, it is possible to contemplate 
with horror the necessity for relitigation simply because a restraint 
has been added to or subtracted from a previous package of restraints. 
Second, the merger cases and guidelines seem to reflect or incor-
porate a theory of oligopolistic behavior that was widely accepted at 
the time, whereas no such theory is available or is as helpful in deal-
ing with distributional restraints. For example, the horizontal 
merger cases and guidelines seem to incorporate the premise that, 
in a market sufficiently concentrated to produce recognized price 
interdependence, any merger likely to intensify it or transmute it 
169. See, e.g., United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 176-77 
(1964) (suggesting an impossibly long list of structural factors for consideration on 
remand). 
170. See text at note 163 supra. 
171. For an example of such an approach, see Note, supra note 11, at 823-32, 
Nevertheless that approach would still produce more litigation than would Schwinn's 
partial per se approach. 
172. 1 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ,r 4510 (1975). 
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from hostile awareness to friendly cooperation is prima facie il-
legal.173 They probably also embrace the more restrictive premise 
that a less concentrated market approaching such interdependence 
cannot be transformed by mergers into one possessing it, and, there-
fore, that any merger between substantial firms in the market is 
prima facie illegal if other similar mergers, which would produce the 
forbidden result, might, or are likely to, follow. 174 The vertical 
merger cases and guidelines, and the analogous exclusive dealing 
cases, clearly involve different considerations, but can still be 
similarly related to a general theory by such structural factors as the 
market shares of the acquiring firm, of the acquired company, and 
of those manufacturers following, or likely to follow, its lead.175 
By contrast, there are no general propositions or theories that will 
enable us to draw the line in distribution cases. Clearly, we should 
prevent all of the leading firms in a concentrated market from 
employing similar restraints and transferring their oligopoly down-
wards. We might also object if a single, nondominant firm with dif-
ferentiated market power did this because the net effect is direct 
horizontal restraint among its dealers. For example, assume that a 
certain manufacturer of television sets is believed by many to have 
developed a superior color system that others do not or cannot 
employ. Do we wish to permit that company to fix retail prices on 
these desirable, expensive products, even though it does not domi-
nate market sales? If not, should we allow it to accomplish an 
equivalent result through other distributional restraints? And after 
others eventually match it technologically and its price falls, should 
we then permit that manufacturer to stabilize its market position 
through such restraints? Each of us may hold strong views on the 
proper answers to these questions, but how can we relate them to 
some helpful, widely held theory? I do not know how to do this 
or even how to begin. It is difficult enough to draw lines when a 
single restraint is used by a manufacturer whose market position is 
changing in a changing market. It is next to impossible when a vary-
ing package of restraints is used. 
173. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962). 
174. Cf. United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 280-81 (1966) 
(White, J., concurring). 
175. The vertical integration cases are, of course, vastly more complicated than 
this and in fact the results therein cannot be related as directly to general theory as 
with horizontal merger cases. Compare Bok, supra note 15, with Bok, supra note 18. 
For this reason, the percentages chosen for the vertical merger guidelines are arguably 
more arbitrary or debatable than those chosen for the horizontal ones. But such 
choices would be even more arbitrary and debatable in distribution cases because of 
greater concern there with the activities of a single firm. 
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The obvious way out is to outlaw the use of certain restraints 
while generally allowing the use of others. This was done long ago 
with price fixing and exclusive dealerships. Schwinn merely ad-
vanced this process of trading off the presumed legality of some re-
straints for the per se illegality of others, and GTE Sylvania will 
essentially complete it, regardless of how the location clause finally 
fares. Moreover, it is possible that the results yielded by these cases 
coincide closely with those that would have been reached if business 
and government had· been forced to settle the matter over the bar-
gaining table.176 There is, furthermore, no evidence at the moment 
that business is unable to satisfy its legitimate needs through the use 
of those restraints that are still available. Thus, although this trade-
off process may represent a unique antitrust solution, it was respon-
sive to the almost unique problem of a series of interrelated re-
straints. Indeed, this unique problem, upon which the more tradi-
tional approaches foundered, proves to be at once the source and 
strength of the partial per se solution, in that the multiplicity that 
defied reasoned analysis lent itself nicely to bargaining and tradeoff. 
176. Some evidence of this assertion is supplied by the consent decrees entered 
into by defendants in these cases. See, e.g., United States v. White Motor Co., 1964 
Trade Cas. 79,762 (N.D. Ohio 1964). 
